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COUNTERING HATE MESSAGES THAT LEAD
TO VIOLENCE: THE UNITED NATIONS’S
CHAPTER VII AUTHORITY TO USE RADIO
JAMMING TO HALT INCENDIARY
BROADCASTS
I.  INTRODUCTION
Fervent, fiery speeches draw an audience and excite a crowd.
Speeches given by a skilled orator can ignite passions, and just a few
spoken words with the correct pizzazz can incite people to take ac-
tion.  Actions inspired by motivating speech can be for good or bad
purposes, and the greater the audience, the greater the effect the
speech has in producing thought or action.  As the audience grows, so
does the impact on individuals, communities, and society as a whole.
Because of its ability to pervasively spread a message and its sus-
ceptibility to being manipulated, radio is a powerful tool in the hands
of a talented orator, a leader with a passionate plea, or a crafty mes-
senger with an inspiring message the people want to hear.1  Radio
heightens the impact speech can have on people because it enables
people in a number of different locations to hear the same message at
the same time.  Control of the radio airwaves is a powerful asset, and
misuse of that asset can have disastrous results.
The survivors of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, who were en-
gulfed by the racist, fervid broadcasts of hate radio, can provide first-
hand testimony of these disastrous results.2  The primary source of
Copyright © 2001 by Alexander C. Dale.
1. See generally Jaime F. Metzl, Rwandan Genocide and the International Law of Radio
Jamming, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 628, 628-29 (1997) (discussing radio as a powerful tool and instru-
ment in propaganda).
2. See Francois Misser & Yves Jaumain, Death by Radio, INDEX ON CENSORSHIP, Sept.–
Oct., 1994, at 73 (“Survivors of the massacres say the extent of the killing and the uncontrollable
size of the subsequent exodus would not have happened without [the radio broadcasts].”).  See
generally ARTICLE 19, BROADCASTING GENOCIDE: CENSORSHIP, PROPAGANDA & STATE-
SPONSORED VIOLENCE IN RWANDA 1990-1994 (1996) [hereinafter BROADCASTING
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hate radio in Rwanda, Radio-Television Libre des Mille Collines
(RTLM), was a nominally private radio station created in 1993 with
informal connections to high-ranking government extremists.3 The
government officials to whom RTLM was connected belonged to the
Hutu ethnic group that ruled in opposition to the Tutsi group.  Prior
to the mass killings in April 1994, RTLM targeted its messages to the
Interahamwe (“those who attack together”)—a private youth “death
squad” set up by the Hutus—who would hear these RTLM criticisms
of Tutsis and moderate Hutus who sympathized with Tutsis and then
attack them.4
The plane crash that killed Rwandan President Juvenal
Habyarimana on April 6, 1994, spurred the station’s active role in
promoting and assisting the genocide of the Tutsi people in Rwanda.5
It remains uncertain who shot down President Habyarimana’s plane,6
but RTLM had announced three days earlier that a “little something”
would soon occur and was the first source to announce the crash.7  Af-
ter the crash, RTLM advocated the killing of Tutsis by associating
them with the opposition political party, the Rwandese Patriotic
Front (RPF), which the station claimed had killed President
Habyarimana and was invading the country.
There is some disagreement as to whether RTLM support for the
killing of civilians was direct or indirect.8  However, RTLM clearly
GENOCIDE]; PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROW WE WILL
BE KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES: STORIES FROM RWANDA (1998).
3. See BROADCASTING GENOCIDE, supra note 2, at 70; Metzl, supra note 1, at 630; Misser
& Jaumain, supra note 2, at 74 (“According to the former governor of the National Rwandan
Bank, Jean Birara, the radio station received its electricity supply directly from the presidential
buildings.  Destroyed by RPF bombing around 25 April, RTLM was on the air again three days
later, courtesy of the government-owned Radio Rwanda’s second channel.”).
4. See Metzl, supra note 1, at 631.  Cf. Philip Gourevitch, The Genocide Fax, THE NEW
YORKER, May 11, 1998, at 42.
5. See Metzl, supra note 1, at 630-31; Misser & Jaumain, supra note 2, at 72-73.
6. See Madeline H. Morris, The Trials of Concurrent Jurisdiction: The Case of Rwanda, 7
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 349, 351 (1997); BROADCASTING GENOCIDE, supra note 2, at 110.
7. BROADCASTING GENOCIDE, supra note 2, at 109-10 (“The station reportedly broadcast
information about the downing of the plane by 9.00 p.m., within an hour of the crash.”).
8. See id. at 112.  International media attribute RTLM with directly inciting and support-
ing the murders of Tutsis in Rwanda.  See, e.g., Neil Munro, Infowar: AK-47s, Lies, and Video-
tape, COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM, July 1999, at 19 (RTLM’s “hateful radio propaganda
spurred the killing of 800,000 Tutsi men, women, and children”).  For example, RTLM is attrib-
uted with making statements directly calling for murder such as “The grave is only half full.
Who will help us to fill it?”  BROADCASTING GENOCIDE, supra note 2, at 112.
On the other hand, ARTICLE 19 performed one of the most extensive studies of RTLM
broadcasts and found no evidence in either broadcast transcripts or witness testimony that
linked RTLM with this direct call for murderous action.  See BROADCASTING GENOCIDE, supra
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played a role in promoting the killings as a “final war” or “final bat-
tle” in which members of the Hutu majority were made to feel they
had to kill all Tutsi “rebels” and “accomplices” (which was inter-
preted to mean all Tutsis and all Hutus who sympathized with the
Tutsis—including civilians) in order to ensure their own survival.9
RTLM associated all Tutsis with the RPF and described them as
“bloodthirsty monsters, who killed for the sake of killing.”10  Accord-
ing to RTLM, there was no point in negotiating with the Tutsis be-
cause nothing short of their elimination could quench their thirst for
blood and neutralize the threat they posed.11
Through these messages, RTLM’s greatest contribution to the
genocide may have been convincing the entire Hutu population in
Rwanda—men, women, and children—that they had a “duty” to join
the war against the Tutsis by committing acts of genocide.12 For ex-
ample, RTLM systematically arranged roadblocks, and all able-
bodied Hutus were expected to patrol them and execute all Tutsis on
the spot.13  The station suggested weapons to use for killing,14 and
RTLM broadcasts recited lists of named “enemies” who subsequently
were tracked down and executed by militias.15  Often, these “ene-
note 2, at 112.  However, even this study could only be based on witness testimony and broad-
cast recordings taken during the first two weeks of the genocide by a correspondent in hiding.
See id. at v, 112.  Furthermore, after these recordings were taken, they had to be drafted into
broadcast transcripts, translated into French, and then translated into English.  See id. at v.
Given the small timeframe of the recorded broadcasts, the loss of memory by witnesses of the
exact wording of RTLM broadcasts, and the difficulties of several translations, it is difficult to
tell conclusively what was said during all of the RTLM broadcasts.  Therefore, it is not clear
whether RTLM’s role in calling for murderous action by Hutus against the Tutsis was direct or
indirect.
9. See BROADCASTING GENOCIDE, supra note 2, at 112-13.  See also Bill Berkeley,
Sounds of Violence: Rwanda’s Killer Radio, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 22, 1994 at 18.
10. BROADCASTING GENOCIDE, supra note 2, at 112.  See also Berkeley, supra note 9, at
18 (RTLM announcer said the RPF was “cheating people with smooth words while it is a wolf
which covers itself with a sheep’s skin.  They are killing Hutu and lie that they do no harm to
them.”).
11. See BROADCASTING GENOCIDE, supra note 2, at 113.
12. See id. at 114.  Cf. Berkeley, supra note 9, at 18 (“‘I did not believe the Tutsis were
coming to kill us,’ says Alfred Kiruhara, [an illiterate peasant who has spent most of his life cul-
tivating sorghum and sweet potatoes in. . .eastern Rwanda]. . .‘but when the government radio
continued to broadcast that they were coming to take our land, were coming to kill the Hutus—
when this was repeated over and over—I began to feel some kind of fear.’”).
13. See Metzl, supra note 1, at 631; BROADCASTING GENOCIDE, supra note 2, at 114-17.
14. See BROADCASTING GENOCIDE, supra note 2, at 117 (“‘Fight them with the weapons
at your disposal; you have arrows, you have spears. . . .Take up your traditional ‘tools.’’”); Mis-
ser & Jaumain, supra note 2, at 74 (“Instructions allegedly broadcast by RTLM included infor-
mation on the handling of grenades and different methods of killing the ‘enemy.’”).
15. See Metzl, supra note 1, at 631; BROADCASTING GENOCIDE, supra note 2, at 120.
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mies” were civilians or even Hutus mistaken for Tutsis.16  “Enemies”
and “accomplices” attempting to leave Rwanda were also identified
on the air to be riding in specific vehicles, and these cars were then
stopped and the passengers killed.17  Along with coordinating these
activities, RTLM also cheered the perpetrators, praised their “heroic”
actions, and often hosted extremist speakers to encourage listeners in
continuing the “war” effort.18
In effect, RTLM became an arm of the Hutu government in the
conflict,19 and the language used by RTLM to incite genocide indi-
cated that the objective of this armed combat was not simply to win
the government’s battle but to utterly destroy the Tutsi race.  Al-
though it is impossible to say precisely to what extent media propa-
ganda contributed to the genocide, it can be assumed that RTLM
broadcasts assisted in the annihilation of between 500,000 and
1,000,000 Rwandans.20  These killings were committed by neighbors,
were performed through hacking to death by machetes and other ru-
dimentary weapons, and were often accompanied by torture and
rape.21
16. See BROADCASTING GENOCIDE, supra note 2, at 120-24; Munro, supra note 8, at 19.
17. See BROADCASTING GENOCIDE, supra note 2, at 120; Metzl, supra note 1, at 631
(“Specific vehicles, such as a red van allegedly ‘full of accomplices,’ were identified, together
with license numbers.  The red van, which was carrying Francois Ncunguyinka, a former prefect
of Gisenyi prefecture, and his family, was halted at a roadblock and all its passengers were
killed.”).  Georges Ruggio, a voice of hate radio on the RTLM during the genocide, was sen-
tenced to 12 years in prison by a U.N. tribunal in June 2000 for—among other things—using the
radio to provide rampaging Hutus with the whereabouts of fleeing Tutsis.  See Thomas Ome-
stad, The Voice of Hate Radio, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, June 12, 2000, at 34.
18. See BROADCASTING GENOCIDE, supra note 2, at 116-17; Metzl, supra note 1, at 631-32.
19. See BROADCASTING GENOCIDE, supra note 2, at 115.
20. Cf. Misser & Jaumain, supra note 2, at 72-74; Berkeley, supra note 9, at 19 (“Even Tut-
sis whose families were attacked blame the radio broadcasts for exploiting Hutu ignorance.
‘The popular masses in Rwanda are poorly educated,’ says a Tutsi businessman whose wife and
children are presumed dead.  ‘Every time the powers that be say something, it’s an order.  They
believe someone in political authority.  Whatever this person demands, it’s as if God was de-
manding it.’”).  For statistics on the exact total of human losses in Rwanda, see Letter Dated 1
October 1994 From the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council,
U.N. SCOR, P 43, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1125 (1994); Morris, supra note 6, at 350; Metzl, supra note
1, at 629 (“[A]n estimated eight hundred thousand people, mostly Tutsi, were killed.”); and
Tara Sapru, Into the Heart of Darkness: The Case Against the Foray of the Security Council Tri-
bunal into the Rwandan Crisis, 32 TEX. INT’L L.J. 329, 332 (1997) (“The Rwandan crisis left over
a half-million Rwandans dead and another 4.5 million displaced—figures that represent nearly
two-thirds of the country’s population.”).
21. See Morris, supra note 6, at 350.
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II.  CONTROLLING THIS TYPE OF SPEECH
As the impact of RTLM’s broadcasts demonstrates, radio is the
most significant means of mass communication throughout all of sub-
Saharan Africa.22  Radio control is a particularly powerful asset in
Rwanda, where many people live in rural areas with high illiteracy
rates, and where most people can speak only the local language—
Kinyarwanda—which is broadcast on only a few stations originating
in the area.23 Although there were several radio stations with signals
in the Rwandan airwaves prior to and during the genocide, once the
fighting escalated, government support provided RTLM with almost
complete control of the airwaves.24  While other radio stations, such as
Radio Rwanda, suffered severe damages restricting their broadcast
range, the government continually repaired RTLM during the fight-
ing.25  As a result of this domination of the airwaves, the powers be-
hind RTLM used their virtually unfettered control to spread mes-
sages of hate and murder.26
With this control over such a powerful form of mass communica-
tion, what could have been done in order to stop RTLM and possibly
discourage the genocide?  There are few politically viable answers to
this question, but in 1997, Jaime Frederic Metzl explored the possible
impact that jamming RTLM’s incendiary radio broadcasts would have
had on the massacres in Rwanda in 1994.27  Radio jamming occurs
22. See BROADCASTING GENOCIDE, supra note 2, at 45 (discussing importance of radio in
Africa).  On the history and power of radio in “developing” countries, see generally Cross-
Frontier Broadcasting: And Nation Shall Speak Guff unto Nation, THE ECONOMIST (London),
May 2, 1992, at 21.
23. See BROADCASTING GENOCIDE, supra note 2, at 45.
24. See BROADCASTING GENOCIDE, supra note 2, at 3, 45 (discussing RTLM’s “virtual ra-
dio monopoly” caused by its connection to the government during the genocide).
25. See id at 3, 136.
26. See Munro, supra note 8, at 19.
27. See Metzl, supra note 1, at 636, 651; Jaime F. Metzl, Information Intervention: When
Switching Channels Isn’t Enough, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Nov. 1997, at 16.  The United States con-
sidered whether it should radio jam RTLM, but it initially refused, claiming that it would have
been too technologically difficult to jam and that such jamming would have violated interna-
tional law.  See BROADCASTING GENOCIDE, supra note 2, at 144.  The United States later
claimed that it could not find the frequency on which the station was broadcasting and that
RTLM had stopped broadcasting by the time the United States was ready to jam.  See id. at 144-
45.  Instead of jamming, the United States supported a pro-peace radio station broadcasting into
Rwanda from Burundi.  See Munro, supra note 8, at 20.
In contrast to the United States, France failed to consider the possibility of jamming
RTLM.  France did not consider radio jamming when it entered Rwanda in July 1994, because
jamming was not part of the French government’s mandate for what the French sent troops to
do in Rwanda as agreed to by the United Nations.  See BROADCASTING GENOCIDE, supra note
2, at 145.
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when an outside source sends a disrupting radio signal to overtake
and consume all or some of the available radio frequencies. The issue
of radio jamming does not appear to have been brought before the
United Nations during the Rwandan genocide,28 but Metzl believed
that jamming RTLM’s frequency might have “mitigated this catastro-
phe” of genocide in Rwanda.29
Since broadcasts promoting murderous action against the Tutsi
people have reemerged in the Democratic Republic of Congo and
Tanzania,30 the United Nations’s role in either radio jamming or oth-
erwise countering these broadcasts needs to be assessed.  Metzl pro-
posed that the United Nations create a “specialized international
force” to counter incendiary communications by either jamming such
signals or broadcasting other signals promoting peace.31 Metzl’s pro-
posal for a “specialized international force” is a step in the right direc-
tion.  However, his discussion only briefly touches on the United Na-
tions’s authority to take such an action to radio-jam these broadcasts.
This Note will assess the United Nations’s role in radio jamming to
counter these broadcasts, including the legality and feasibility of such
an action.  First, this Note will briefly explain what radio jamming is
and how the United Nations can jam the broadcasts in the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo and Tanzania, as well as other incendiary
broadcasts in the future. Second, this Note will examine the Security
Council’s legal authority to jam broadcasts under Chapter VII of the
U.N. Charter, international treaties, and international law.  Finally,
this Note will develop a workable standard delineating what types of
speech the United Nations can jam and the mechanisms through
which jamming should occur. This standard and these mechanisms
must still allow and carry a presumption for the free expression of
opinions and ideas.  However, they must not allow this expression to
incite genocide and other breaches of international peace.
28. See generally BROADCASTING GENOCIDE, supra note 2, at 145-46 (describing the U.N.
discussions immediately prior to the end of the genocide surrounding RTLM but not addressing
the possibility of radio jamming).
29. Metzl, supra note 1, at 636.
30. See Stefan Lovgren, The Resurgence of Hate Radio: Rwanda, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT, May 18, 1998, at 44; Philip Gourevitch, Comment: Waking up to the next war, THE
NEW YORKER, Oct. 26 & Nov. 2, 1998, at 51.
31. Metzl, supra note 27, at 18-19.
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III.  COUNTERING INCENDIARY BROADCASTS
As the Rwandan genocide in 1994 demonstrates, radio’s ability
to shape a person’s mind and behavior can have catastrophic results.
To help prevent a recurrence of a similar atrocity, the United Nations
needs a method to prevent incendiary radio broadcasts.  Radio jam-
ming the hate broadcasts reemerging in the Democratic Republic of
Congo and Tanzania would allow the United Nations to either silence
the airwaves or replace broadcasts calling for the elimination of the
Tutsis with broadcasts that advocate peace.
Radio jamming is defined as “the deliberate emission of electro-
magnetic (EM) radiation to reduce or prevent hostile use of a portion
of the EM spectrum.”32  In other words, radio jamming fills the air-
waves by placing either a disrupting signal (causing just noise or
“fuzz”) or an overriding signal (a different broadcast) into a specific
frequency on the electromagnetic spectrum.33
The jamming of radio broadcasts in the Democratic Republic of
Congo and Tanzania could be conducted through a variety of differ-
ent methods.  One possibility is “spot jamming.”  Through spot jam-
ming, the United Nations would use a receiver to find the signal fre-
quency transmitting the incendiary broadcasts and then tune a
jamming signal to that frequency.34  Although hostile Hutu broadcast-
ers could change their frequency (“frequency hopping”) or use other
measures to avoid this pinpoint technique of jamming, they would not
be able to do so with great ease, since the technology used by these
mobile, Hutu refugee broadcasters is probably not highly advanced.35
Another radio jamming alternative is “barrage jamming.”  This
type of jamming operates over a large number of frequencies, rather
than just one.36  Barrage jamming would prevent hostile broadcasters
from frequency hopping and would allow for the simultaneous jam-
ming of several transmitters.37  However, there are a number of
32. Don Herskovitz, A Sampling of RF Jammers, 17 J. OF ELECTRONIC DEF., Aug. 1994, at
60.  For a general discussion of radio jamming methods and uses, see generally LAWRENCE W.
MYERS, IMPROVISED RADIO JAMMING TECHNIQUES: ELECTRONIC GUERILLA WARFARE
(1989).
33. See Don Herskovitz, Come, Whisper in My Ear, J. OF ELECTRONIC DEF., June 1995, at
48.
34. See generally Herskovitz, supra note 32, at 60; MYERS, supra note 32, at 25.
35. See Herskovitz, supra note 33, at 47.  Given the rebuilding of the Rwandan nation and
the instability in the surrounding states, it is unlikely that broadcasters would have the techno-
logical capabilities to “hop” between signal frequencies with any speed, if at all.
36. See Herskovitz, supra note 32, at 60.
37. See generally id.
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problems with this type of jamming.  First, barrage jamming requires
a large amount of technological equipment that is costly, weighty, and
takes up immense space.38  It may be also be inappropriate because
the United Nations would be forced to interfere with and disrupt a
large number of other radio frequencies in the Democratic Republic
of Congo and Tanzania.  Interfering with several of these nations’ ra-
dio frequencies would be less appealing politically than interfering
with the single frequency of incendiary broadcasts.  Since the Hutu
broadcasters are unlikely to frequency hop, the United Nations would
probably prefer spot jamming.
The actual apparatuses used for jamming the Democratic Re-
public of Congo and Tanzania broadcasts could be placed in several
different locations.  The jamming could be done from an outpost in-
side Rwanda, from a position in a neighboring country, or from a mo-
bile unit either in the air or on land.  Given the political instability in
Rwanda, jamming from a planted base within the country or from a
mobile unit on Rwandan soil would be the most dangerous strategies.
Thus, jamming would probably be most feasible from just inside a
neighboring ally’s borders or from the air.
Many countries have the technological capabilities to carry out
radio jamming,39 and the United States has the technology to jam
broadcasts from the air.40  The U.S. Air Force has a $70-million plane
with a fuselage filled with hi-tech electronic equipment that allows an
eleven-man crew to jam a radio or television broadcast and replace it
with a substitute message.41  Although slow and propeller-driven, this
aircraft can fly beyond the range of potentially hostile ground troops
in the Hutu refugee camps and can replace messages of hate with
messages of peace.42  
The technology for radio jamming is available for the United Na-
tions to use. The question is whether the Security Council can and
will use this power to halt the hate broadcasts in the area surrounding
38. See id.
39. For discussions about the radio jamming capabilities of countries other than the United
States, see, for example, Radio Comes Down from the Mountains in Search of Listeners, IPI
REPORT, Sept. 1992, at 10 (El Salvador) and Steve Forbes, Lifting the Electronic Curtain – for
Now, FORBES, Dec. 26, 1988, at 27 (former Soviet Union). For a discussion of radio jammers
made by companies outside the United States, see Herskovitz, supra note 33, at 48-50 (Austra-
lia, England, Germany, Italy, and Israel).
40. See Herskovitz, supra note 33, at 48; Metzl, supra note 27, at 19.
41. See Douglas Waller, America’s Persuader in the Sky, TIME, Aug. 21, 1995, at 43.
42. See id.; Metzl, supra note 27, at 18.
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Rwanda and to avoid future incendiary messages broadcast through-
out the world.
IV.  AUTHORITY TO ACT
Article 2, Paragraph 7 of the U.N. Charter prohibits the United
Nations from interfering in matters essentially within the domestic ju-
risdiction of states.43  However, broadcasts in the Democratic Repub-
lic of Congo and Tanzania calling for the elimination of the Tutsi race
could probably be characterized as dealing with more than a domestic
matter, since the effects of the violence between the Hutus and Tutsis
have extended into several countries surrounding Rwanda.44  On the
other hand, the violence between these ethnic groups could be seen as
a civil war in Rwanda—a domestic matter—regardless of how far the
violence has spread.  Also, if these new incendiary broadcasts are ac-
tually emerging from the Democratic Republic of Congo or Tanzania,
then these nations may argue that the United Nations—which is
based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all states—would
be violating the spirit of the U.N. Charter because the radio jamming
interferes with their sovereignty.45
This prohibition in Article 2 is not absolute.  In order to avoid
the legal questions arising from further involvement in these Rwan-
dan conflicts, it is likely that the United Nations would act through
the Security Council, which has “primary responsibility for the main-
tenance of international peace and security.”46  Under Chapter VII of
the U.N. Charter, the United Nations, by the authority of the Security
Council, can interfere in purely domestic situations, as long as those
situations are threats to international peace and security.47  This chap-
ter is the only section of the U.N. Charter that directly empowers the
43. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7 (“Nothing contained in the present Charter shall
authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement un-
der the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement
measures under Chapter VII.”).
44. See generally GOUREVITCH, supra note 2, at 166 (discussing the establishment of
Rwandan refugee camps in Zaire, Burundi, and Tanzania).
45. Cf. Sapru, supra note 20, at 352-53 (arguing that the U.N. decision to create the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda interfered with Rwandan sovereignty, violated Article
2, paragraph 7 of the U.N. CHARTER, and was therefore unconstitutional).
46. U.N. CHARTER art. 24, para. 1.
47. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7 (stating that the U.N. principle of not interfering with
“matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. . .shall not prejudice
the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII”).
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Security Council to make decisions that are binding on all Members
of the United Nations.48
Under Chapter VII, Articles 39, 41, and 42 would give the Secu-
rity Council authority to jam the broadcasts of the Hutu extremists.49
Article 39 requires the Security Council to make two determinations
prior to taking action: (1) the Security Council must determine that a
threat to peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression has occurred,
and (2) the Security Council must make recommendations or select
measures to maintain or restore international peace and security that
are “in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United
Nations.”50
The Security Council has exclusive authority to decide what con-
stitutes a breach of peace, threat to peace, or act of aggression.51  The
drafters of the U.N. Charter intentionally provided the Council with
wide discretion “to decide freely when a threat to the peace, a breach
of the peace, or an act of aggression exist[s].”52  In evaluating this dis-
cretion, the trial chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) said the Security Council’s decision on what consti-
tutes a breach of peace, threat to peace, or act of aggression is not re-
viewable by another organ of the United Nations.  The reason for this
decision was that “discretionary assessments . . . involve the consid-
eration of a number of social, political and circumstantial factors
which cannot be weighed and balanced objectively” by the trial
chamber.53  As a result, the Council’s decision determining whether a
situation is a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggres-
sion is generally considered discretionary and final.54
The Security Council has found a wide variety of situations that
constitute breaches of peace, threats to peace, or acts of aggression.55
48. See Faiza P. King, Sensible Scrutiny: The Yugoslavia Tribunal’s Development of Limits
on the Security Council’s Powers Under Chapter VII of the Charter, 10 EMORY INT’L L. REV.
509, 516 (1996).
49. Cf. Sapru, supra note 20, at 339 (discussing the authority given to the Security Council
in Articles 39, 41, and 42).
50. U.N. CHARTER art. 39; see Sapru, supra note 20, at 339; King, supra note 48, at 517.
See generally, U.N. CHARTER, art. 24, para. 2.
51. Decision on Jurisdiction, Case No. ICTR-96-15-T [hereinafter Kanyabashi]; King, su-
pra note 48, at 517.
52. David Wippman, Change and Continuity in Legal Justifications for Military Intervention
in Internal Conflict, 27 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 435, 466 (1996) (quoting THE CHARTER OF
THE UNITED NATIONS) (Bruno Simma ed., 1994).
53. Kanyabashi, supra note 51, at 6.
54. See Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 12 (1994).
55. See King, supra note 48, at 518; Wippman, supra note 52, at 462-63, 466-68.
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For example, serious violations of humanitarian law and human
rights, such as the repression of Kurds in Iraq, famine in Somalia, and
ethnic cleansing in Bosnia,56 have been considered threats to interna-
tional peace.57  However, except for the situation in Bosnia, none of
these situations leading to U.N. action has involved the kind of “ag-
gressive use of force across a boundary” which traditionally consti-
tutes a threat to international peace.58  Critics of the United Nations
actions claim that the United Nations’s recent involvement in hu-
manitarian emergencies has come without the actual existence of a
threat to peace.59  Regardless of whether this criticism is accurate or
not, there has been an expansive interpretation by the United Nations
of what constitutes a threat to international peace.60  It appears that
the Security Council’s expansive view of its legal authority to act un-
der Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter would provide the Council with
authority to intervene in virtually any large-scale internal conflict.61
The “sufficient transboundary effects” found in these types of con-
flicts would allow the Council to interpret these conflicts as threats to
international peace and to therefore intervene in the conflict pursuant
to the Council’s Chapter VII authority.62
If the Security Council finds that a threat to peace, breach of
peace, or act of aggression took place, then the Council shall choose
measures to maintain or restore peace that are “in accordance with
the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.”63  Since the Secu-
rity Council has found more situations as threatening international
peace, Security Council actions under Article 41 of the U.N. Charter
have increased since the end of the Cold War.64  For example, most of
the previously mentioned interventions for human rights abuses en-
tailed measures consistent with Article 41, which provides that “[t]he
Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of
armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions.”65  It
furnishes a non-exhaustive list of such measures, including the com-
56. See Wippman, supra note 52, at 462-63.
57. See King, supra note 48, at 518-19.
58. Wippman, supra note 52, at 463.
59. See Richard A. Falk, The United Nations and the Rule of Law, 4 TRANSNAT’L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 611, 630 (1994).
60. See Wippman, supra note 52, at 438.
61. See id. at 463-64.
62. See id.
63. U.N. CHARTER art. 24, para 2; see generally U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
64. See Schachter, supra note 54, at 12.
65. U.N. CHARTER art. 41.
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plete or partial interruption of economic relations and the severance
of diplomatic relations.66  Although this list is considered non-
exhaustive, there is disagreement about exactly what types of actions
under Article 41 are permissible.67  The general requirement is that
the action taken must be consistent with the “Purposes and Principles
of the United Nations.”68  However, it remains unclear what level of
consistency is required.  Some legal scholars say that this provision
provides the Security Council with all powers necessary to fulfill its
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security as it sees fit, so long as the Council acts in accordance with
the purposes and principles of the United Nations.69  Others say that
the measure to be pursued by the Security Council must be among, or
at least of the nature of, those listed in Article 41.  They claim that
previous actions taken by the Security Council, such as creating judi-
cial bodies (International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY)
and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)), exceed the
Council’s authority under the U.N. Charter because they are “too far
removed from the economic and political nature of the measures ex-
pressly contemplated in Article 41.”70  Regardless of which interpreta-
tion is correct, the Security Council enjoys great discretionary
authority under Article 41 to choose measures it finds appropriate to
restore or maintain international peace and security.71
Like Article 41 of the U.N. Charter, Article 42 empowers the Se-
curity Council to take action in order to restore or maintain interna-
tional peace and security.  However, Article 42 deals exclusively with
measures that incorporate the use of force.  These measures involving
military force are only to be used if the measures adopted under Arti-
cle 41 are considered to be, or have proven to be, inadequate to main-
tain or restore international peace.  The radio jamming proposed in
this article is a measure without the use of force, so it would not fall
within the ambit of Article 42 but would instead qualify as an Article
41 measure.
66. See id.  See also VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER’S GUIDE TO
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 42; Sapru, supra
note 20, at 340.
67. See generally Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (Int’l Crim. Trib. Former Yugo. App. Ch., Oct.
2, 1995), reprinted in 35 I.L.M 32, 44-45 (1996) [hereinafter Tadic Appeals Decision].
68. U.N. CHARTER art. 24, para 2.
69. See MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 66, at 42-43.
70. Sapru, supra note 20, at 340.
71. See Tadic Appeals Decision, supra note 67, at 43.
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It was previously stated that the Security Council’s decisions
about what constitutes a threat to peace, breach of peace, or act of
aggression under Article 39 were generally final and discretionary.
The reason these decisions were only generally final and discretionary
is due to the ICTY’s decision in Prosecutor v. Tadic.72  The Tadic de-
cision established the standard of review to be given to the Security
Council’s discretionary determinations under Chapter VII.73  The two
Chambers of the Yugoslavia Tribunal, the Trial and Appeals Cham-
bers, provided different standards, but they both expressed a reluc-
tance to examine closely the Council’s Chapter VII decisions.74
The Trial Chamber said that the Security Council’s decisions on
Chapter VII measures should not be “arbitrary” or for an “ulterior
purpose.”75 Evaluating whether a Council decision about the exis-
tence of a threat to peace is arbitrary entailed merely a procedural re-
view—inquiring whether the Security Council made a fully informed
and carefully considered judgment, regardless of whether the decision
was substantially correct in the Trial Chamber’s opinion.  However,
evaluating whether the choice of a measure to respond to this
threat—under either Article 41 or 42—is arbitrary entailed deter-
mining whether the Security Council’s decision was reasonable in
light of the threat to peace identified.
In contrast, the Appeals Chamber’s standard of review was even
more deferential and focused on the “Purposes and Principles of the
[U.N.] Charter.”76  According to the Chamber, there merely had to be
some basis for the conclusion that a threat to the peace existed, and
72. See generally Tadic Appeals Decision, supra note 67, at 42-45; Prosecutor v. Tadic,
Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction 8 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugo. 1995) [hereinafter Tadic Trial Chamber].  See also King, supra note 48, at 556-57
(“With respect to the stringency of review of these two discretionary determinations, the Ap-
peals Chamber’s position could be characterized as the reverse of that advanced in the Cham-
ber’s decision.”).  These decisions involved a challenge to the creation of the International Tri-
bunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia.  See id. at 513.  This
Tribunal was created by the U.N. Security Council pursuant to its Chapter VII authority.  See id.
at 511.
73. See King, supra note 48, at 555.
74. Compare Tadic Appeals Decision, supra note 67, at 42-45 (expressing a reluctance to
review Chapter VII decisions and establishing the standard of review for Chapter VII decisions
to be whether the decision was in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the U.N.
Charter) with Tadic Trial Chamber, supra note 72, at 8 (suggesting that review of Chapter VII
decisions should involve only an examination to make sure the decisions were not “arbitrary” or
for an “ulterior purpose.”).  See also King, supra note 48, at 557.
75. See Tadic Trial Chamber, supra note 72, at 8; King, supra note 48, at 555.
76. Tadic Appeals Decision, supra note 67, at 43; King, supra note 48, at 556.
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the choice of measures to restore or maintain peace was left entirely
to the Council’s discretion.77  As a result, although repudiation by a
Tribunal of the Council’s decision to use its Chapter VII powers
could occur, the Tadic decision still leaves great discretion and trust in
the hands of the Council in making its Chapter VII decisions.
An important political consideration that should be mentioned to
conclude this analysis is the United Nations’s desire to use measures
other than military action to achieve its objectives.  After the murders
of U.N. soldiers in Somalia in 1993, U.N. Member States, particularly
the United States, have been reluctant to send their citizens to serve
as peacekeepers in U.N. military actions.78  The United Nations has
the ability to use force, but this use is supposed to be the last resort.
U.N. action is not intended to wage war but to bring peace and “save
succeeding generations from the scourge of war.”79  As a result, in-
termediate measures short of military force are favored methods of
U.N. action, and radio jamming would, therefore, be looked upon fa-
vorably as a method to prevent the United Nations from having to
take military action in the future.
V.  INCITEMENT
The Security Council must first decide whether the incendiary
broadcasts originating from the Democratic Republic of Congo and
Tanzania constitute a threat to international peace and security, and
if radio jamming would be an appropriate measure with which to re-
spond.  However, in making this decision, the Council must give sub-
stantial weight to free expression concerns.  Although these broad-
casts in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Tanzania may
provide an example of when radio jamming is appropriate, hate
speech broadcasts and racist commentary may not always rise to the
level of a threat to international peace and security that warrants cen-
sorship.
A general international presumption exists which supports the
free flow of ideas and information.80 However, the force of this pre-
sumption was tempered by the precedents set in the Nuremburg tri-
77. See Tadic Appeals Decision, supra note 67, at 42-43.
78. See Gourevitch, supra note 4, at 46  (According to assistants to U.N. Secretary-General
Kofi Annan, the United Nations’s reluctance to act in Rwanda can be attributed to the U.N.
Member States, particularly the United States, “los[ing their] appetite[s] for peacekeeping op-
erations after Somalia.”).
79. Falk, supra note 59, at 635, quoting U.N. CHARTER preamble.
80. See Metzl, supra note 1, at 649-50.
DALE.DOC 04/04/01  3:08 PM
2001] COUNTERING HATE MESSAGES 123
als, which established that certain forms of propaganda leading to
violence are violations of international law.81  “Incitement” is the term
frequently used to define this form of illegal propaganda, but it has
been used and defined differently by various nations in the interna-
tional community throughout history.82  Speech rising to the level of
incitement is generally susceptible to regulation in some fashion un-
der international law.  Incitement would be a useful and politically vi-
able standard for the United Nations to use as its benchmark for
when broadcasts constitute a threat to international peace and secu-
rity.
How incitement is defined determines what speech can be cen-
sored and what speech is criminally actionable under international
law.  In the Nuremburg trials, actionable incitement required both
words inciting people to violence and the actual physical realization
of those words.83  The words had to call specifically for the type of
violence later accomplished, and a direct link from the speech to the
actions had to be established.  However, the Nuremburg trials did not
address how to deal with these types of speech before the physical act
of violence occurs.
Following Nuremburg and throughout the Cold War, the United
States and the Soviet Union took opposite positions at international
conventions on what standard should be adopted for determining
when speech rises to the level of incitement.84  The United States al-
ways supported virtually absolute freedom of speech and expression,
because it feared any exception to this freedom would enable the So-
viet Union to censor U.S. broadcasts promoting democracy in com-
81. See id. at 636.
82. See generally Metzl, supra note 1, at 638 (explaining how “incitement to commit geno-
cide” in the final wording of the 1948 Genocide Convention was interpreted differently by dif-
ferent countries following the Convention).
83. See id. at 637.
84. See Stephanie Farrior, Molding the Matrix: The Historical and Theoretical Foundations
of International Law Concerning Hate Speech, 14 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1, 14-16 (1996).  For
example, in drafting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the U.S. and Soviet represen-
tatives disagreed about what type of actions rose to the level of incitement in the context of ra-
cial, political, and religious discrimination.  See id. A Soviet representative to the Commission
drafting the Declaration proposed an amendment to Article 7 of the Declaration (the equal pro-
tection provision) that would declare advocacy of racial or religious hatred as incitement to dis-
criminate.  See id. at 15-16.  However, Eleanor Roosevelt, Chair of the Commission on Human
Rights, declared that the United States would not support the Soviet amendment, and in the
end, it failed.  See id.  Article 7 of the Universal Declaration states that “[A]ll are. . .entitled to
equal protection against. . .any incitement to [ ] discrimination.”  Id. at 17.  However, the in-
citement to discrimination provision “may be interpreted as allowing restrictions on hate
speech, if such speech is deemed to advocate discrimination.” Id.
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munist-controlled countries.  In contrast, the Soviet Union wanted to
stop these same U.S. broadcasts, and therefore supported a standard
that allowed for more censorship.  In the end, however, tenuous com-
promises were achieved, and several conventions ended with treaties
generally promoting free speech but condemning inciting speech.85
Crafting a specific limitation on freedom of speech that is accept-
able to all international parties involved is a complex and difficult
process.86  However, international conventions with a free speech
provision frequently allow this freedom to be overcome by speech
that can be characterized under some definition of incitement.87  The
1948 Genocide Convention ended with a treaty declaring that speech
that is a “[d]irect and public incitement to commit genocide” is pun-
ishable under international law.88  Other treaties followed with similar
provisions.  Article 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
guarantees equal protection by declaring that “[A]ll are. . .entitled to
equal protection. . .against any incitement to. . .discrimination,” and
this provision has been interpreted as allowing restrictions on speech
advocating discrimination.89  Article 19 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights protects freedom of expression, but it
also allows speech to be restricted under certain circumstances.90  One
such circumstance is spelled out in Article 20(2) of this Covenant,
which provides that “any advocacy of national, racial, or religious ha-
tred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence
shall be prohibited by law.”91  Article 4 of the International Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination pro-
hibits incitement to racial hatred in an effort to “prevent[] rather than
85. See id. at 14-17.  It should also be mentioned that U.S. officials—on their own accord
following the Rwandan genocide—drafted a new President Decision Directive (PDD) on Inter-
national Public Diplomacy which gives the State Department the task of harnessing all federal
tools—including radio jamming equipment—to counter future hate radio with radio messages
promoting peace.  See Munro, supra note 8, at 20.  However, the PDD does not give instruction
on what standard should be used to evaluate whether speech is “hate radio” or on who should
make the decision to jam these “hate radio” broadcasts.
86. See Farrior, supra note 84, at 5.
87. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, Dec. 16,
1966, art. 20 para. 2.
88. Metzl, supra note 1, at 638; Farrior, supra note 84, at 87.
89. Farrior, supra note 84, at 17.
90. See Metzl, supra note 1, at 640-41.  Restrictions are allowed under Article 19 when they
are “necessary. . .for respect of the rights or the reputations of others.”  Farrior, supra note 84,
at 21.
91. Farrior, supra note 84, at 4; Metzl, supra note 1, at 641.
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cure” racism and racial discrimination.92  The American Convention
on Human Rights also contains an article that protects free speech
but also limits this freedom by declaring that “propaganda for war
and advocacy of hatred that constitute incitements to violence are
punishable by law.”93
Although all of these international agreements contain incite-
ment provisions, they differ in what constitutes actionable incitement.
For instance, in the context of racism and hate speech, the disagree-
ment surrounds the question of what speech should be restricted—
speech that incites ideas of racial hatred, speech that incites acts of
non-violent discrimination, or only speech that incites violence based
on racism and hatred.  Obviously, these different standards for what
constitutes actionable incitement restrict speech in different ways.
For example, restricting speech that incites ideas of racial hatred will
include restricting messages of racial superiority, but it will also obvi-
ously include restricting speech that incites violence based on racism.
However, restricting speech that constitutes an incitement to violence
will allow speech promoting only the ideas of racial hatred to con-
tinue.
In addition to this disagreement about what kinds of speech con-
stitute actionable incitement, there is also disagreement about what
should be done when speech falls under the respective treaty’s defini-
tion of incitement.94  For example, the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination requires
speech rising to its defined level of incitement to be a criminal of-
fense.95  In contrast, Article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights only mandates that incitement is punishable by
law, which could include civil or administrative remedies in addition
to a criminal penalty.96
Despite these disagreements in the various treaties, international
law provides no impediment for the United Nations to regulate
speech, via its Chapter VII authority, under an appropriate incite-
ment theory.  The appropriate incitement theory is one that only re-
stricts speech that incites violence.  An incitement to violence stan-
dard under this theory is the least restrictive form of an incitement
standard found in international law under the aforementioned trea-
92. See Farrior, supra note 84, at 48.
93. Id. at 77.
94. See id. at 48.
95. See id. at 49.
96. See id.
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ties.  There is disagreement about whether an international incite-
ment standard should extend so far as to restrict speech inciting ha-
tred, but in all the international treaties previously discussed, regu-
lating speech that rises to the level of inciting violence is clearly
permissible.  Under an incitement to violence standard, speech that
merely espouses racist tenets or calls for non-violent racial discrimi-
nation would still be allowed, leaving freedom of expression still
strongly entrenched.  However, speech that incites violence, like the
broadcasts of RTLM in Rwanda in 1994, would be subject to regula-
tion under this standard.
Since incitement has been defined differently by various coun-
tries throughout history, a definitive standard for what constitutes in-
citement to violence must be clearly established.  This standard must
stop speech that incites violence, but it still must be narrow enough to
prevent other non-violent forms of speech from being subject to
regulation.  The U.S. government has historically been one of the
most ardent supporters of free speech, both internationally and do-
mestically.  However, U. S. courts have conceded that in certain situa-
tions freedom of expression must give way to conflicting social inter-
ests.97  One of these instances, when freedom of expression can be
overcome in the United States, is when the speech falls under the
U.S. domestic version of an incitement standard.  This standard was
originally articulated in the 1969 case Brandenburg v. Ohio, when the
Supreme Court said that speech that “is directed to inciting or pro-
ducing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
actions” can be restricted.98  This incitement standard still remains as
precedent for such issues in the United States, despite judicial urgings
to abandon it.99
97. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (allowing for the restriction of
speech that is likely to incite and does incite imminent lawless action); Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (allowing for the restriction of free expression to protect citizens
from unwanted noise); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981) (allowing the President to revoke a
passport for national security reasons because the former passport holder’s expression of opin-
ions and information placed CIA agents in danger); United States v. Progressive, 467 F.Supp.
990 (1979) (relying on national security interests to prevent publication of information about
how to make a nuclear weapon); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (allowing for re-
striction of speech in order to protect the “well being” of children and to support “parents’
claim to authority in their own household”).  See also KENT R. MIDDLETON ET AL., THE LAW
OF PUBLIC COMMUNICATION 38 (4th ed. 1997).
98. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).  See also MIDDLETON, supra note 97, at
41.
99. See Paul E. Kostyu, The First Amendment in Theory and Practice, in COMMUNICATION
AND THE LAW 21, 34 (W. Wat Hopkins, ed., 2000).
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A slight variation of the U.S. version of an incitement standard
should be applied by the United Nations.  The United Nations’s defi-
nition of incitement should include speech that is directed to inciting
or producing imminent violence and that is likely to incite or produce
such actions.  This standard has not been chosen merely because the
U.S. definition was easily attainable or because it was used by the
U.S. court system.  The U.S. courts have wrestled with how to define
incitement, and applying it internationally will by no means be easy.
However, this definition of incitement is assumed to be the best stan-
dard, because if it has been tweaked throughout the years by the
courts to satisfy the U.S. government, which has one of the strongest
legal regimes for the protection of free speech,100 then it should be suf-
ficiently narrow to protect free speech as much as possible without
sacrificing the goal of preventing speech leading to violence.  The
slight variation in the U.S. language (from “imminent lawless action”
to “imminent violence”) should also be even more accommodating to
the United States and other ardent protectors of free expression be-
cause it restricts free speech less than the original Brandenburg stan-
dard.101  In addition, the international standard for incitement pro-
moted by the United States during the Cold War was even more
protective of free speech than the U.S. domestic incitement standard
enunciated in Brandenburg.102  In other words, the Brandenburg stan-
dard restricts speech more than the incitement standards promoted
by the United States internationally.  This inconsistency suggests the
United States may be willing to allow more international regulation
of inciting speech, if the international regulation does not rise above
the level of regulation under the U.S. domestic incitement standard.
100. See Metzl, supra note 1, at 644.
101. Although Brandenburg allows for restrictions on speech that incites imminent “lawless
action,” incitement to imminent violence is chosen as the standard for Security Council action
under Article 39 of the Charter. Cf. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1967).  This shift
from “lawless action” to violence was taken to make the Security Council’s actions restrict free-
dom of expression only as much as is needed to help prevent future atrocities like those in
Rwanda in 1994.  A standard of imminent violence restricts free expression much less than a
standard that allows for regulation and censorship when the speech only incites imminent law-
less action.  In developing this standard for the Security Council to act upon, a balance had to be
reached between the competing interests of protecting freedom of expression and of preventing
human rights violations and other threats to or breaches of international peace and security.
This author feels that this balance is best achieved by an incitement to imminent violence stan-
dard.  Under this standard, serious international atrocities committed with the assistance of the
broadcast media will be deterred, but most expression will remain free from U.N. regulation.
102. See Metzl, supra note 1, at 645.
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The Security Council should fulfill its duties under the U.N.
Charter by using its discretionary powers under Article 39 to establish
that speech rising to this incitement standard is a threat to or breach
of international peace and security.  By utilizing this version of the
standard articulated in Brandenburg, speech that is “directed to in-
citing or producing imminent [violence and that] is likely to incite or
produce such actions” would be a threat to or breach of international
peace and security.  Under Article 39 and the Tadic decisions, the Se-
curity Council has virtually unlimited discretion to establish this lan-
guage as the standard for determining when a threat to or breach of
international peace and security has occurred.  Although the United
Nations should continue to promote free speech, those limited forms
of speech constituting incitement under this standard should be
regulated by the Security Council pursuant to its Chapter VII author-
ity and its “responsibility for the maintenance of international peace
and security.”103
If the Security Council adopts this form of incitement as a threat
to or breach of international peace and security, as it should, then the
Council will need to clarify the language in this standard.  For exam-
ple, what qualities of speech make it “likely to incite or produce” im-
minent violence?  What is imminent violence?  The Security Council
needs to clearly define these terms in order to avoid repeating the in-
consistent application of incitement restrictions within the aforemen-
tioned international treaties.104  “Likely to incite or produce” could
require an element showing that these messages have been used be-
fore to incite or produce violence in the same audience, or a showing
that an average audience member receiving the messages would, un-
der the audience member’s present circumstances, be led to act vio-
lently upon hearing the message.  However, the process of defining
these terms should be left to the discretion of the Security Council, as
Chapter VII allows.  The Security Council should still have discretion,
in order to allow it to take into account all of the social, political, and
economic impacts of its decision.  However, as a base line, the terms
in this incitement standard should be defined at all times in a way that
is consistent with international law and the purposes and principles of
the U.N. Charter.105
103. U.N. CHARTER art. 24, para. 1.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 80-93.
105. There has been some disagreement about how the Security Council’s actions should be
bounded.  Some argue that the Council must act in accordance with international law.  See King,
supra note 48, at 563.  However, the Appeals Chamber in the Tadic decision established that the
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Once “incitement constituting a threat to or breach of interna-
tional peace and security” is clearly defined, the Council arguably has
even wider discretion under Article 41 of the Charter in choosing
what methods to take in order to eliminate speech falling under this
incitement standard.106  In all situations where speech rises to the level
of being actionable incitement, the Council should consider radio
jamming as an appropriate Article 41 measure to eliminate this threat
to or breach of international peace and security.  The technology to
make radio jamming an effective measure to stop the broadcasts is
available, and radio jamming arguably offers less interference in the
affairs of the sovereign nations and has fewer side-effects stemming
from its use than other Article 41 measures.  Radio jamming may not
necessarily be the best Article 41 measure to utilize at all times when
speech falling under this incitement standard arises.  However, radio
jamming should be considered a favored choice to employ when in-
citement to violence occurs.
After incorporating this new incitement standard into its Chapter
VII authority, the Council’s first action should be to evaluate the
broadcasts originating from the Democratic Republic of Congo and
Tanzania that call for renewed efforts to exterminate Tutsis.  Should
the Council find these broadcasts to constitute incitement as defined
and proposed above, then the Council should declare the inciting
broadcasts a threat to or breach of international peace and security.
The Council could use these broadcasts as the benchmark for defining
the language in its new incitement standard.  These broadcasts are
precisely the form of speech this proposed international incitement
standard should regulate, and the Security Council should define the
terms of this new incitement standard to cover these forms of broad-
casts.  In the past, messages from these same broadcasters have
caused the same audience members to take violent action.  Therefore,
these new broadcasts are “likely to incite or produce” violence.  Also,
the targeted Hutu audience members for these incendiary broadcasts
calling for elimination of the Tutsis are currently living in exile from
their homes while the Tutsi-led regime remains in power in the
Security Council’s determinations under Article 39 of the Charter were limited by the Purposes
and Principles of the United Nations.  See id. at 582-83.  As a result, restricting the Council’s
discretion in defining the terms in this proposed definition within these two boundaries should
protect the Council’s determination from being overturned if ever placed under review.
106. See generally King, supra note 48, at 554-55  (discussing how the Tadic Appeals Cham-
ber was reluctant to review the Security Council decision on what measure to use in response to
threats to international peace and security, since this choice involves “political evaluations of
highly complex and dynamic situations”).
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Rwandan government.  Many of these Hutu refugees are living in un-
clean accommodations with limited food and unsanitary water.  As a
result, violence should be perceived to be imminent, since these po-
tential aggressors, targeted by the radio broadcasts, are in situations
in which a violent response would appear to be the only solution to
their current problems.  These broadcasts constitute incitement and
are a threat to or breach of international peace and security under
Article 39 of the U.N. Charter.  As a result, the Security Council
should act pursuant to its Article 41 authority and radio jam these in-
cendiary broadcasts.
VI.  CONCLUSION
Free speech proponents may cringe at the suggestion of allowing
the United Nations to engage in radio jamming under the suggested
standard.  However, creating a clearly defined standard for when ra-
dio jamming is appropriate would enable international interests, like
preventing genocide, to be taken into account, and the limited stan-
dard proposed here would not detract significantly from the ideal of
freedom of expression.  As Metzl said:
[W]hile forming an exception to the general rule of nonjamming
still creates some danger of establishing a loophole that might be
misapplied in other contexts, changes in the global political envi-
ronment and humanitarian and political disasters like the situation
in Rwanda strongly suggest that new issues like the prevention of
genocide need to be factored into policy considerations.107
With this proposal for U.N. action, a strong presumption against us-
ing radio jamming would still remain to generally protect free speech
and expression.  However, a narrowly defined and precisely outlined
exception for broadcasts rising to the level of incitement would en-
able the international community to place value where value should
be placed—on protecting human life, regardless of incidental restric-
tions on human expression.  Although both freedom of expression
and the right to life are crucial human rights concerns, they should
not be given equal weight.  The protection of human life internation-
ally through the prevention of genocide can be encouraged by allow-
ing the United Nations to have this small power to limit freedom of
speech.
The answer frequently given for how to respond to hate speech is
to provide more speech to counteract the messages of hate.108  How-
107. Metzl, supra note 1, at 646.
108. See BROADCASTING GENOCIDE, supra note 2, at 1.
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ever, in many nations, including Rwanda in 1994,109 more speech can-
not be provided to counter hate speech because of tight licensing
regulations and other restrictions imposed by the national govern-
ment.  In these nations, there is no current method for responding to
hate speech.  However, even in nations where additional speech can
be provided, hate speech that incites audience members to violence
cannot always be remedied by merely promoting messages of peace
and non-discrimination.  As a result, there needs to be an alternative
answer when hate speech incites audience members to violence, re-
gardless of whether a nation allows hate speech to be counteracted by
words of reconciliation.
Allowing the United Nations to radio jam hate speech that rises
to the level of incitement is the appropriate and possibly only solution
for stopping this destructive speech.  The U.N. Security Council can
act pursuant to its discretionary authority under Chapter VII of the
U.N. Charter to establish that speech rising to an incitement standard
is a threat to or breach of international peace and security.  The Secu-
rity Council can define incitement based on the definition pro-
nounced by the U.S. Supreme Court in Brandenburg.  This definition
will provide a standard that comports with international law and that
only restricts free speech to the smallest extent necessary in order to
allow the United Nations to fulfill its duty to maintain peace and se-
curity.  Under this limited standard, the United Nations can fulfill its
duty of maintaining international peace and security without sharply
limiting free speech and thereby offending the nations that most zeal-
ously protect free speech.  Although granting the United Nations this
authority somewhat curtails free speech throughout the world, this is
a small concession to make to stymie a recurrence of the killings in
Rwanda, to prevent future genocide throughout the world, and to
protect all human life in the international community.
Alexander C. Dale
109. See BROADCASTING GENOCIDE, supra note 2, at 3.
